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Abstract. This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government 
expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953- 
1993, allows for different types of government spending. Ingeneral, spending is inspired by 
ideological nd opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward 
drift during election times and the 'partisan' motives behind government spending are clearly 
revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than 
right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value xpenditure oninfrastructure and defense 
more than left-wing parties. 
1. Introduction 
Modem-day political economic theory is characterized by a plethora of mod- 
els emphasizing at one time the benign govemment agent providing the medi- 
an voter the public goods he demands, at another instant he opportunistic 
policy maker trying to fool the public during elections, or at still another point 
in time the ideological or 'partisan' policy maker who represents he interest 
of a certain group in society and who designs policies that are favourable to 
those groups. 
The first wave of the political cycles literature originated with a precursory 
article by Kalecki (1943). The literature developed rapidly some thirty years 
later by the introduction of Nordhaus's (1975) Political Business Cycle (PBC) 
model and Hibbs's (1977) partisan model. In the PBC model, political cycles 
stem from the policy makers' incentives to create booms in election years in 
order to increase their chances of reelection. In the partisan model, different 
political parties have different preferences over economic goals, so that the 
alternation of parties in office leads to political cycles. In Frey and Schneider 
(1978a, 1978b) the PBC model and the partisan model are reconciled. In their 
model, the party in office implements partisan policies when reelection is 
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safe, but generates an electoral cycle when the prospects for reelection are 
poor. 
The second wave of studies on political cycles was a reaction to the 'ratio- 
nal expectations' critique, most fervently expressed by Lucas (1976). The 
assumption underlying earlier studies that economic agents in general and 
voters in particular can be systematically fooled was relaxed. Alesina (1987) 
was one of the first to develop arational expectations version of the partisan 
model. The predictions of his model deviate from those of the Hibbs model 
in that cycles in real variables only occur in the first part of each adminis- 
tration's term. Persson and Tabellini (1990) show that even when voters are 
rational and forward-looking, political business cycles may exist if voters 
have incomplete information about he competency of the government. 
Most of the empirical research on political cycles is based on highly aggre- 
gated, macroeconomic variables, such as national output growth, unemploy- 
ment, inflation or money aggregates. The evidence of the Nordhous model 
is mixed. For the United States, Haynes and Stone (1989) report evidence 
of PBCs in output growth, the unemployment ra e and inflation, but McCal- 
lum (1978) and more recently Alesina and Roubini (1992) find weak or no 
evidence. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) examine vidence of the PBC 
model for eighteen OECD countries. Only for Germany and New Zealand 
monetary policy is found to be consistent with the PBC model. As to fiscal 
policies the evidence of the PBC model is somewhat s ronger. Alesina (1988) 
and Tufte (1978) find that in the United States transfer payments tend to 
be increased uring election years and Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) 
report (irregular) PBCs in budget deficits using panel data for eighteen coun- 
tries. The evidence of the (rational) partisan model is relatively strong, at least 
for the United States (see Alesina, 1988). 
As mentioned earlier, evidence is mainly presented in terms of macroeco- 
nomic variables. Few authors have tried to detect political cycles in govern- 
ment expenditures onspecific types of public goods and quasi-public goods. 
We regard this as a lacuna in the literature because recent heoretical studies 
on political cycles focus on how elections may affect government spend- 
ing. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) present a model in which 
office seeking policy makers may increase government spending on highly 
visible projects in election years to signal their competency to incompletely 
informed voters. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) have shown in a different set-up 
why government deficits arise, a phenomenon that is explained by the conflict 
between parties on the composition of the government expenditures and the 
inability of current voters to bind the choices of future voters. Moreover, sev- 
eral countries participate in a fixed exchange rate regime or have delegated 
monetary policy to an independent central bank. In those countries monetary 
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instruments cannot be employed for achieving electoral or partisan goals so 
that the policy makers have to rely on the mix of fiscal instruments. 
In this paper we take the logical step suggested by the recent heories on 
political cycles and examine whether various categories ofgovernment spend- 
ing exhibit political cycles. To test for political effects on various categories of
public spending, we need a structural model of government spending. We rely 
on the public goods model first used by Borcherding and Deacon (1972). In 
this model the amount of public goods provided by the government depends 
on income, relative prices, and population size. 
We apply the analysis to the Netherlands. We find the case of the Nether- 
lands interesting for a number of reasons. First, the Netherlands has almost 
always participated in a fixed exchange rate regime. Against his background 
it is hardly surprising that Dutch monetary instruments are never found to 
exhibit clear political cycles. Examining the discretionary power of cabinets 
with respect to the composition and level of public spending therefore seems 
like a sensible research strategy. Furthermore to test the implications of the 
Rogoff model and to examine the empirical relevance of the Tabellini-Alesina 
model one needs to examine government behaviour on a relatively low level 
of aggregation. I  order to explore this possibility we examine data published 
by the Central Planning Bureau on various categories of public expenditures 
for the Netherlands, including expenditures on defense, infrastructure, pub- 
lic administration, health care, education and social security transfers. The 
second reason is that in the post-war period the Netherlands has only known 
coalition governments. It is often claimed that in such a political setting polit- 
ical cycles are less likely to occur than under conditions of a two-party system 
(Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Third, there exists relatively little research on 
political cycles in government expenditures for the Netherlands. An exception 
is Renaud and Van Winden (1987) who have tested the Frey and Schneider 
model for the Netherlands. Using aggregate data on government expenditures, 
they found no clear evidence for political cycles. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a general 
outline of the theoretical models of government spending that will be tested 
in this paper. Section 3 briefly discusses the data and in Section 4 we report 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The public goods model 
The central theme of this paper evolves around the question whether gov- 
ernment spending ismotivated by ideological or opportunistic motives. Some 
recent studies emphasize the influence of elections on political decisions. 
Two strands in this literature can be distinguished. The first deviates from the 
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public goods model in that voters are imperfectly informed about he policy 
maker's competence, i.e., the policy maker's ability to provide public goods 
efficiently (Rogoff, 1990). Naturally, voters prefer a competent policy maker 
to an incompetent policy maker. This induces a competent policy maker to 
signal his competence byproviding more public goods than socially desired. 
This type of models predicts that near elections public output is on average 
relatively high. The second strand in this literature focuses on partisan cycles 
in policies. The main assumption is that each political party caters to the 
desires of its core constituencies. As a consequence, a change in the political 
colour of the cabinet may lead to changes in the size or composition of public 
spending (see Renand and Van Winden, 1987). 
It would, however, be rather bold to state that government spending is 
solely determined by the ideological motives of the members of a cabinet. 
The opinion of the (median) voter also matters. The interplay between the 
median voter and the incumbent government in questions of government 
spending has been used extensively in the economic approach to the size of 
the government. The 'public goods' model is based on conventional price 
theoretic principles, emphasizing individual preferences for public goods and 
the costs of the provision of those goods (Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; 
Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). As to the supply side of public activities, it
is assumed that politicians eek office. Under conventional ssumptions about 
voters' preferences, the level of public activities chosen by the elected policy 
maker coincides with the median voter's demand for public activities. This 
approach leads to the prediction that the size of the government varies with 
the median voter's income, the price of public goods relative to the price of 
private goods and the population size (or density). Several authors have tried 
to assess the income and price elasticity for public activities (see, for a survey, 
Borcherding, 1985). Most of them report an income lasticity smaller than 1 
and a price elasticity greater than -1, thereby rejecting a rigid interpretation f 
Wagner's law and providing support o Baumol's 'cost-disease' hypothesis, 
i.e., the hypothesis that the growth of government is caused by the relative 
increase in the price of public goods and services, which are assumed to be 
produced under technologically inferior conditions compared to the private 
sector. 
The time-series analysis of this paper is based on the following equation, 
adopted from the public goods model: 
(Yt)al (Pit~ c~2 
Git = Zit Ntt \PYt, ] N~ 3. (1) 
Where Git is real government expenditures on good i at time t, Yt/Nt is per 
capita income, Pit/Pyt is the price of Git(Pit) relative to the price of private 
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goods (Pyt), and Nt denotes the total population size. Finally, Zit represents all 
other factors that affect the demand for public goods. In principle, (1) is the 
basic equation used by authors following the traditional economic approach. 
In Section 4 we examine the effects of elections and ideology on various 
categories of government spending in the Netherlands. We base the empirical 
analysis on (1). To test for electoral and ideological cycles Zit includes an 
electoral dummy variable and a variable measuring the ideological charac- 
teristics of the government. Furthermore, Zit includes autoregressive terms, 
a constant, a trend variable and various measures of the composition of the 
Dutch population. 
3. Data 
To estimate quation (1) we need time series on public expenditures, income 
and population size. The figures on public expenditure are extracted from the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB, 1994) and GDP and population figures are 
based on the National Accounts of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
In the absence of data on the median income we will use per capita GDP 
as an approximation. For a detailed escription of the data we refer to these 
publications. In the appendix to this paper we present the definitions of the data 
used. The political variables are constructed by employing data on elections 
and cabinet composition (Daalder and Schuyt, 1991). Some of the details of 
the data are given in the sections below. 
3.1. Government expenditures 
We consider the following number of expenditure categories: defense, infrastruc- 
ture, public administration, health care, education, and social security benefits. 
Figures 1 a through 1 f show the time series properties for each category, where 
expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP at current prices. 
The most striking feature of these pictures is that each and every cate- 
gory has a distinct different history, thereby bringing home the point that a 
disaggregate analysis of government expenditure is a potentially worthwhile 
exercise. Apart from the differences between the various ratios of expenditure 
categories there are some similarities. All expenditure atios rose in the first 
two decades of the sample period, except for the expenditures on defense. At 
the end of the sample period all, save one, expenditure ratios declined. The 
reversals of the expenditure ratios began at different imes. Expenditure on 
infrastructure started to decline at the end of the sixties, education expenditure 
in the mid-seventies and expenditure on public administration and transfer 
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Figure 1. 
a clear upward trend throughout the sample period. The empirical results 
presented in the next section suggest that the ageing of the population may 
have caused the steady rise in the health care expenditure atio. 
3.2. Political variables 
To examine whether the various ratios of government expenditures xhibit 
political cycles we make use of dummy variables and an indicator of the 
ideology of the government. The dummy variables are meant o capture the 
idea behind the PBC model that incumbents ry to show better economic 
performance near elections than at other times in order to increase their 
prospects for reelection. In principle, the incumbent can do so in two ways. 
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First, they can try to make voters feel wealthier when casting their ballots 
by increasing visible government expenditures, such as transfers, just before 
elections. This is the conventional view on the PBC model (see, e.g., Tufte, 
1978). Second, incumbents may signal favourable conomic ircumstances 
through proposals for relatively large spending increases in the budget acts 
at the end of their administrative t rms. (cf. Hackl, Schneider, and Withers, 
1993). Because there exists a time lag between the approval of the budget act 
by parliament and the implementation f the policy plans, the plans become 
only effective after elections are held. Thus this view on the PBC model 
suggests that government spending may increase after elections rather than 
before lections. To account for both views on the PBC model in the empirical 
analysis, we use the following three dummy variables: 
dum b = 
dumc = 
duma = 
1 in the year before every planned election year and is zero 
otherwise; 
1 in every planned election year and is zero otherwise; 
1 in every year after planned election year and is zero otherwise. 
As the descriptions of the dummy variables uggest, we only allow for elec- 
toral effects around planned election years. In the Netherlands (1952-1994 
period), five out of thirteen elections were by-elections which were held 
because the government resigned before their (four years) terms had been 
completed. 
To test for partisan cycles in the various government expenditure atios we 
have constructed an indicator of the ideology of Dutch post-war coalitions. 
This indicator is defined as follows: 
ML - -  MR 
IDEOL = (2) 
ME + Mc + MR 
where ME, MR and Mc denote the number of left-wing, right-wing and 
ministers of the center in a cabinet, respectively. Ministers who were not a 
member of a political party are excluded from this variable. Table 1 shows 
how the number of ministers of left-wing, centre and right-wing parties has 
varied over time for the period 1946-1994. Ministers of the centre political 
persuasion (CDA and before 1977: ARP, CHU, KVP) are assumed to have 
a neutral role in the explanation of government spending cycles. This is not 
to say that they have no (explanatory) power at all. The ministers of the 
centre parties dampen the influence of left-wing or right-wing ministers by 
influencing the numerator f the IDEOL definition. 
As discussed above, there is a time-lag between the design of policy and 
its implementation. For this reason, partisan cycles do not exactly coincide 
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Table 1. Number and colour of cabinets ministers, the Netherlands 1946-1994 
Period Cabinet Number of ministers 
Left-wing Centre Right-wing Not amember 
of a party 
Total 
1946-48 Beel I 6 5 - 3 14 
1948-51 Drees-Van Schaik 5 7 1 2 15 
1951-52 Drees I 5 8 1 1 15 
1952-56 Drees II 5 10 - 1 16 
1956-58 Drees III 5 9 - - 14 
1958-59 Beel II - 10 - - 10 
1959-63 De Quay - 10 3 - 13 
1063-65 Marijnen - 10 3 - 13 
1965-66 Cals 5 9 - - 14 
1966--67 Zijlstra - 13 - - 13 
1967-71 De Jong - 11 3 - 14 
1971-72 Biesheuvel I 2 11 3 - 16 
1972-73 Biesheuvel II - 11 3 - 14 
1973-77 Den Uyl 10 6 - - 16 
1977-81 Van Agt I - 10 6 - 16 
1981-82 Van Agt II 9 6 - - 15 
1982-82 Van Agt III 5 9 - - 14 
1982-86 Lubbers I - 8 6 - 14 
1986-89 Lubbers II - 9 5 - 14 
1989-94 Lubbers III 7 7 - - 14 
1994- Kok 9 - 5 - 14 
Source: Daalder and Schuyt (1991). 
Note. Centre parties are: CDA = Christian Democrats, CHU = Christian Historical Union, 
ARP = Protestant Party, KVP = the Catholic Party. The parties KVP, ARP, CHU merged in 
1977 into the general confessional party Christian Democratic Appeal. Left-wing parties 
are: D'66 = Democrats '66, DS'70 = Democratic Socialists 1970, PvdA = Labour Party. 
The right-wing party is VVD = Conservative Party. 
w i th  changes  in the  compos i t ion  o f  cab inets .  To assess  the  lags  o f  the  e f fec t  o f  
IDEOL on  government  spend ing ,  we  have  inc luded IDEOLt  in the  regress ions  
o f  the  government  spend ing  rat ios  w i th  var ious  lags.  
4. The empirics of government spending 
Th is  sect ion  repor ts  some s imple  regress ions  o f  the  ra t ios  o f  the  pub l i c  spend-  
ing  categor ies  ( re la t ive  to GDP)  on  the  po l i t i ca l  var iab les  d i scussed  above .  
As  a s tar t ing  po in t  fo r  the  empi r i ca l  ana lys i s  serves  equat ion  (1) wh ich ,  a f te r  
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taking logarithms, can be rewritten as: 
g i+P i - -Y - -Py  = (eel-- 1) (y -- py) 4- (a2 q-1) (pi -- Py) 
-{-(o/3 - al)n + ~flizi (3) 
where lowercase l tters indicate logarithms of the variables described inequa- 
tion (1) and zi represents all other variables (business cycle, demographics) 
including the electoral dummy variables and the indicator of ideology. To 
test the implications of the Rogoff model and to examine the empirical rel- 
evance of the Tabellini-Alesina model we examine government behaviour 
on a relatively low level of aggregation. The public expenditure categories 
include xpenditures ondefense, infrastructure, public administration, health 
care, education and social security transfers. Other spending categories such 
as subsidies (to consumers and producers) and foreign government transfers 
have been excluded from our analysis because these categories are too hybrid 
to yield meaningful conclusions. 
Most of the time series of public spending have autoregressive properties. 
We have added autoregressive terms to the regressions to correct for them. 
The number of autoregressive terms are based on the Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test. Although we mark some of these xpenditures a  public goods, we 
are well aware that indivisibilities in the use of public services and goods are 
quite common. Since equation (3) typically pertains to goods and services that 
are characterized by various degrees of indivisibility and non-excludability, 
we emphasize the results for spending on public and quasi-public goods. 
The results for social security transfers hould be regarded as illustrative. 
Probably, adifferent type of model should be used for this particular category 
(see, e.g., Kristov, Lindert, and McClelland, 1992). 
We have carried out the empirical analysis in two steps. First, we estimated 
the general form of (3), including the three electoral dummy variables and 
the lagged indicators of ideology. 
Table 2 reports the estimates obtained in step 1. 
The first three rows of the second part (below the dotted line) in Table 2 
report he estimates of the three lectoral dummy variables for the various gov- 
ernment spending categories. Overall, the estimation results provide vidence 
in support of the political business cycle theory. All government spending cat- 
egories, perhaps with the exception of health care, tend to rise near planned 
election years. However, Table 2 shows some variation in the timing of the 
electoral cycles across government spending categories. Only the estimation 
results for public spending on defense (and perhaps ocial security transfers) 
are consistent with the conventional view on the PBC theory that govern- 
ment spending rises just before elections. Our findings for infrastructure and 
education expenditures seem to be consistent with the alternative view that 
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Table 2. Election and partisan cycles in the various government expenditure atios 
Dependent variable: Government spending (as % in GDP) in: 
Public goods Quasi-public goods Transfers 
Defense Infrastructure Public Education Health care Social 
equation equation administration equation equation security 
equation equation 
Income elasticity, -0.098 0.679 0.841"* 0.625** 1.476"* 1.627"* 
c~ (0.301) (0.488) (0.132) (0.123) (0.207) (0.255) 
Price elasticity, -0.374 -1.956"* 0.159 -0.318"* -0.969** - 
a2 (0.236) (0.661) (0.099) (0.138) (0.188) 
Population size 0.239** 5.820** -3.100"* - 12.403"* -12.767"* 
(0.067) (2.103) (0.592) (2.159) (2.768) 
Constant 4.647 -51.437"* 30.899** -18.241"* -44.016"* -23.898 
(5.697) (19.018) (5.244) (3.292) (12.722) (19.400) 
Trend 0.0014" -0.058** 0.034** 0.016"* -0.223** 0.057 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.027) (0.039) 
Old population . . . .  3.809** 3.405* 
(1.443) (1.803) 
Young population - - - 1.585"* -4.808** 4.279** 
(0.256) (0.517) (0.783) 
Unemployment . . . .  1.993 ** 3.116"* 
rate (0.294) (0.295) 
ELECb 0.008 0.013 0.032** 0.004 0.016 0.038* 
(0.017) (0.033) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.020) 
ELECt 0.070** 0.055 0.034** 0.013 0.010 0.043** 
(0.023) (0.035) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
ELECa 0.014 0.060* 0.033** 0.034** 0.015 0.042** 
(0.014) (0.031) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
IDEOL-1 -0.033** -0.076 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.028 
(0.016) (0.045) (0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) 
IDEOL_2 -0.018 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.044** 0.043** 
(0.014) (0.047) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020) 
AR 4 1 1 0 3 3 
Sample period 1957-93 1954-93 1954-93 1953-93 1956-93 1957-92 
Adj. R 2 0.979 0.934 0.978 0.987 0.997 0.989 
Note. Estimated with OLS, standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ** denote significance 
at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level. The test-statistics at the bottom of the table 
denote the following: AR is the number of autoregressive terms, adj. R 2 is the adjusted correlation 
coefficient. 
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public spending rises after elections are held. Finally, the electoral cycle in 
expenditure on public administration (and perhaps transfers) is consistent 
with both versions of the PBC model. The last two rows of Table 2 report 
the estimation results concerning the partisan effects. The estimates suggest 
that transfer payments tend to be higher under left-wing cabinets than under 
right-wing cabinets. In contrast, public spending on defense and infrastructure 
is relatively low under left-wing cabinets. Furthermore the estimation results 
indicate that the effect of IDEOL on government spending has a lag of one to 
two years. 
Next we estimate the specific form of equation (3). In those cases where 
the political effects reported in Table 2 exceed one year, combinations of 
dummy variables can be used. For example, as to the social security transfers 
we can replace the three dummy variables with a single dummy variable, 
being 1 before, after and in the (planned) election years and zero in other 
years. Table 3 reports the second step of the estimation procedure: the esti- 
mation results of the specific form equations where combinations of dummy 
variables are included in the regressions. All variables whose t-statistics are 
smaller than 1 in absolute terms are excluded from the regressions. Moreover, 
combinations ofdummy variable are used when the restriction dumi = dumj 
(i,j = b, e, a and i ~ j) is not rejected at a five percent significance l vel. 
Let us first consider the estimation results applying to the public goods 
model. Globally, our results are similar to the findings reported in comparable 
studies (cf. Borcherding, 1985): the income lasticity, oq, lies in the interval 
(0, 1), save health care and social security transfers, and the price elasticity, 
o~2, lies in the interval ( -  1, 0). The latter value implies that for the relative 
growth in government size the price of government goods must have risen 
relative to private goods. Empirical evidence (see Central Planning Bureau, 
1994) suggests that this has been the case for the sample period 1950-1990: 
the price of government goods was higher than the price of private goods with 
the exception of period 1981-1987 in which the price of government-provided 
goods dropped relative to the price of private goods. Table 3 also presents some 
clear exceptions to the rule: the income lasticity of defense xpenditure, the 
price elasticity of public administration, the price elasticity of defense and the 
income elasticity of infrastructure are not consistent with the predictions of 
the public goods model. Explaining these anomalous findings is going to be a 
speculative affair. The fact that price theoretic principles of the median voter 
model do not fit the defense xpenditure model is perhaps a consequence of the 
fact that decision making on defense spending is subject to erratic events. The 
aftermath of the military involvement in the Dutch Indies, the fear for the Cold 
War and international defense arrangements have played a dominant role in 
determining the defense budget. For the public administration expenditures 
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the reason for a positive (but insignificant) price elasticity can perhaps be 
traced to the fact that the 'good' public administration is a labour intensive 
one,hence the price of public administration is dominated by the development 
of the wages of civil servants. Given the fact that the expenditures on public 
administration move in tandem with the demand for goods and transfers uch 
as health care, education and social security the sensitivity of the demand for 
public administration to price movements will not be too strong. 
As mentioned earlier, the spending category 'transfers' is quite difficult o 
capture in standard theory. As one can see the significant and large effect of 
the old population of 65 years and over and the rate of unemployment go a 
long way in explaining the growth in transfers, while the large effect of the 
growth in income can be explained by the initiative to link the social security 
benefits to wage rate developments in the private sector. 
However, the central theme of this paper does not revolve around the 
traditional model. The central question is: do political motives matter? Below 
the dotted line in Table 3 we report some results which suggest hey do 
matter. As one can see from the rows that contain electoral dummy variables 
(ELECi), rather strong effects originating from electoral motives how up in 
the data: the opportunistic variables all have the right sign and are significant 
at (at least) the five percent level (excluding the category 'health care'). 
As one would expect he category social security is heavily affected by the 
pressures brought about by election times. Most of the opportunistic measures 
aimed at influencing election outcomes are felt only in one case during the 
election year itself (ELECe), viz. for the defense xpenditures (see notes below 
Table 3). One more noteworthy point hat one might overlook is the fact that we 
have examined planned elections. Contrary to, for example the U.S., Dutch 
cabinets can be dismissed by parliament and subsequent by-elections are 
marked as unexpected. Once we estimate the effect of all elections, planned 
and unplanned, the electoral effect becomes less important. 
As one can deduce from Table 3 the development of government spending is
also affected by the colour of the cabinet: the ideological variables IDEOL_t 
is statistically significant with the exception of expenditure categories educa- 
tion and public administration. The empirical results indicate that left-wing 
administrations tend to spend more on health care and transfers, while right- 
wing administrations spend more on infrastructure and defense. These results 
seem to be consistent with the main idea behind the partisan theory that left- 
wing parties cater to the desires of low income groups, since expenditures on
health care and social security benefits eem effective means to redistribute 
income from the rich to the poor. The insignificance of ideological motives in 
educational spending can be explained by multi-faced aspects of educational 
services: for left-wing ministers they are the means to establish a more equi- 
Table 3. Partisan and election cycles in government spending, the Netherlands 
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Dependent variable: Government spending (as % in GDP) in: 
Public goods Quasi-public goods Transfers 
Defense Infrastructure Public Education Health care Social 
equation equation administration equation equation security 
equation equation 
Income elasticity, -0.229 0.612 0.921"* 0.627** 1.405"* 1.628"* 
a l  (0.234) (0.449) (0.090) (0.115) (0.185) (0.238) 
Price elasticity, -0.276 -1.967"* 0.226 -0.285** -0.863** - 
0L2 (0.189) (0.544) (0.776) (0.125) (0.156) 
Population size 0.201 6.110"* -3.708** - 12.999"* -12.787"* 
(0.588) (1.971) (0.375) (1.469) (2.577) 
Constant 3.399 -53.886** 36.283** -17.440"* -44.638** -23.246 
(5.122) (17.128) (3.341) (2.937) (10.852) (17.389) 
Trend 0.015" -0.058** 0.036** 0.016 -0.221"* 0.054 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.002) (0.009) (0.020) (0.035) 
Old population . . . . .  3.461"* 3.521" 
(1.049) (1.607) 
Young population . . . .  1.495"* -4.863** 4.245** 
(0.227) (0.458) (0.714) 
Unemployment 0.728 - - - 1.926"* 3.143"* 
rate (0.555) (0.257) (0.273) 
ELECe 0.065** - . . . .  
(0.019) 
ELECa 0.0 l 0 . . . . .  
(O.OLO) 
ELECea - 0.102"* - - 0.045** - - 
(0.047) (0.010) 
ELECbea - - 0.091"* - - 0.122"* 
(0.029) (0.042) 
IDEOL_I - -0.073* - - - - 
(0.039) 
IDEOL_2 . . . .  0.036** 
(0.011) 
IDEOL_ 12 -0 .055*  - -  - -  - - 0.072** 
(0.026) (0.019) 
AR 4 1 1 0 3 3 
Sample period 1957-93 1954--93 1954-93 1953-93 1956-93 1957-92 
Adj. R 2 0.985 0.951 0.982 0.989 0.998 0.994 
Note. Estimated with OLS, standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ** denote significance 
at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level. The test-statistics at the bottom of the table 
denote the following: AR is the number of autoregressive terms, adj. R 2 is the adjusted correlation 
coefficient. The following political variables are used in the analysis: the eleciton dummy ELECe; 
ELECea is ELECe and ELECa combined; ELECbe~ is ELECt, ELECa and ELECb combined; the 
Ideological variables IDEOL_ 1; IDEOL_ 2; and IDEOL_ 12 denotes the unweighted average of 
IDEOL_ 1 and IDEOL_2. 
196 
table primary income distribution and for right-wing ministers education is
an investment good that might stimulate conomic growth. 
How are the empirical results related to the predictions of the recent political 
economic models? Clearly, our results are in line with the main assumption 
underlying the Tabellini and Alesina (1990) model that political parties dis- 
agree about he composition ofpublic spending. This might make the Nether- 
lands an interesting case to examine the main hypothesis of their model, viz. 
that the partyin office runs budget deficits to constrain its successor. Though 
we have detected clear political business cycles in government spending data, 
our results are not fully consistent with the Rogoff (1990) model. In the 
Rogoff model, policy makers are predicted to increase public expenditure on 
highly visible goods, perhaps at the expense of expenditures on less visible 
good (see for an interesting counterargument o  the visibility of public goods 
a contribution by Downs, 1962). Our results indicate that policy makers tend 
to increase xpenditures onall goods, whether they are visible or 'invisible'. 
One interpretation f our results is that around election time policy makers 
are inclined to give in to the pressures of interest groups to avoid conflicts. 
5. Conclusions 
Is fiscal policy used to fool the public in electoral competition oris it used to 
realize the ideological goals of the policy makers in office? At different points 
in time authors have stressed either the 'opportunistic' policy maker as the 
dominant figure behind the design of economic policy or the 'partisan' policy 
maker. Our empirical results suggest that economic policy is induced by a 
mixture of motives and our empirical analysis for the post-war Dutch economy 
supports this view. Both models of the policy maker appear to be applicable 
to the Dutch case. To start with the opportunistic model of policy making: 
government spending for every type of public good or service is always 
increased uring elections. This finding diverges from the Rogoff (1990) 
assertion that politicians use government spending on highly visible goods 
to show off their competence, and as he points out the electoral budget cycle 
"may be a socially efficient mechanism for diffusing up-to-date information 
about he incumbent's administrative competence" (p.22). We show, however, 
that Dutch politicians increase spending on visible goods as well as goods 
with a low media profile. 
Besides peddling for votes during the elections the Dutch policy maker 
is found to satisfy the ideological goals he was elected for. The ideological 
motives appear to be significant in explaining ovemment spending: spending 
is increased by left-wing cabinets on quasi-public goods (health care) and 
social security transfers that favour their traditional low-income constituency. 
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Right-wing cabinets are traditionally more concerned with economic  growth, 
national defense and private responsibil ity in questions of  social security and 
health insurance. The increase in spending on categories such as infrastructure 
and defense and the decrease in health care spending and social security 
transfers are merely the consequence of this pol icy stance. 
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Appendix: Definitions government expenditure 
The data on government expenditures are based on those presented by the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB, 1994). The definitions that are used by the 
CPB are also used in this paper. 1 The following elements of government 
spending across departments and social insurance services are accounted for 
in the construction of the aggregate expenditure categories. 
1. Defense: 
2. Infrastructure: 
3. Public administration: 
4. Education: 
5. Health care: 
6. Social security: 
wages, net consumption; 
investments in land, roads and water construc- 
tions (federal government and other public insti- 
tutions), capital transfers to firms for land, roads 
and water works (National Railway); 
wages, net consumption, i vestment (by federal 
government, other public institutions and social 
insurance); 
wages, net consumption a d investment; 
national health fund, AWBZ, homes for the old- 
aged contributions to non-profit health institu- 
tions, wealth transfers to households; 
Disability insurance: WAO/AWW, ZW, IW, 
WSW 
Demographically related~old-aged: NWOD, 
AOW, AWW, VUT (early retirement benefits 
government employees) 
Demographically related~young: AKW/grants 
Unemployment: WW, RWW, WWV, IOAW, 
IOAZ, TW 
Welfare: ABW (excl. RWW), benefits persecu- 
tion victims, extraordinary pensions, income and 
wealth transfers to pension funds, wealth trans- 
fers to households. 
The price figures for defense, public administration, health care and education 
expenditure are the weighted average of wage costs, net government consump- 
tion and capital consumption. The development of the price of infrastructure 
has been fixed at the price of gross government investment. In constructing 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the help of Harry ter Rele (CPB) in providing us with Dutch 
government xpenditure data. 
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these government 'production' figures it is assumed that there is no growth 
in labour productivity. 

















= National Assistance Act 
= National Children Allowance Act 
= National Old Age Pensions Act 
= National Exceptional Medical Expenses Insurance Act 
= National Widows and Orphans Act 
= Income Provision Act for the Senior Unemployed or Partially 
Disabled 
= Income Provision Act for the Senior Unemployed or Partially 
Disabled Former Self-Employed 
= Disability Act 
= Emergency Act Old Age Pensions 
= Unemployment Welfare Provisions 
= Supplementary Benefits Act 
= Disability Insurance Act 
= National Act for Social Employment Provision 
= Unemployment I surance Act 
= Unemployment Provisions Act 
= Sickness Benefits Act 
